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INTRODUCTION
The different approaches to privacy in the United States and
the European Union are deeply rooted in traditions much broader
than the concept of privacy, such as the role of government in
private life, the role of the press, and the freedoms that are afforded
to the media generally.1 This Comment explores those different
approaches, utilizing the facts of Case C-101/01 Criminal
Proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist,2 a Swedish case sent to the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) that should serve as a warning
to legislators in the United States concerned with protecting
privacy. In Lindqvist, the scope, definition, meaning, and
1

Cf. Arnulf S. Gubitz, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 in
Conflict with the E.U. Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to Airline Passenger
Data Does the United States Need to Combat Terrorism?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 431,
446–47 (2005) (discussing the United States’ broad view of privacy as compared to the
European Union’s restrictive view).
2
Judgment of the Court of 6 November 2003 in Case C-101/01 (Reference for a
preliminary ruling from the Göta hovrätt): Bodil Lindqvist, OJ 2004 C7/3 [hereinafter
Lindqvist Judgment].
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application of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive
(“Data Protection Directive,” “Directive,” “Directive 95/46”)3 was
tested for the first time.4 The Data Protection Directive affects
United States companies involved in data transfer5 in the European
Union.6 The U.S. Department of Commerce has established Safe
Harbor provisions to help companies discern the requirements for
protection of European Union residents’ data in non-E.U.
countries.7
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the Data
Protection Directive and associated European Union regulation
regarding data privacy. Part I also discusses the definitions in the
Data Protection Directive and the issues of third country transfer
and “adequate” protection. Part I concludes with a discussion of
the United States’ Safe Harbor guidelines, which address the
Directive’s third country elements for companies that participate.
Part II explains the European Court of Justice’s decision in
Lindqvist, the case of a Swedish woman who was accused and
found guilty of violating the Data Protection Directive. This Part
will illustrate the interplay between the European Court of
Justice’s decision, the text of the Data Protection Directive and the
3

Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
4
JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital
Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 120 n.235 (2004) (“Lindqvist . . . was the
first case interpreting a national enactment of the European Union’s Data Protection
Directive.”).
5
“Data transfer” is not defined within the text of the European Union’s Data
Protection Directive. See discussion infra Part II.A.5. However, throughout the body of
the Directive, transfer is used in discussions regarding the moving of information from
one location to another. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International
Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1336 (2000).
Processing, storing, collecting, and accessing all seem to be activities related to data
transfer. Id. at 1336.
6
See, e.g., Marsha Cope Huie, Stephen F. Laribee, and Stephen D. Hogan, The Right
to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 391, 396. See also Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at
Chapter IV.
7
See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, available at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited May 5, 2005)
[hereinafter Safe Harbor Overview]; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_documents.html (last visited May 5, 2005).
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comments filed with the Court regarding the Lindqvist controversy.
Further, Part II addresses the limited guidance that multinational
corporations and others concerned with data transfer in the
European Union can take away from the decision and its
commentary regarding the definition of “processing” and
“transfer”; what activities might fall under exceptions of the
Directive; and what the Court considers information regarding
health.
Part III analyzes the European Court of Justice’s reading of the
Data Protection Directive in the Lindqvist case, showing that the
Court offered less delineation and clarity than observers hoped. It
argues that true privacy protection is not ensured by penalizing
private citizens such as Lindqvist, but rather by increased
awareness on the part of consumers and companies of both the
massive quantities of data stored and the transfer of that data. Part
III concludes that the Lindqvist decision should be treated as a
warning to eager politicians in the United States who see an
overarching law as the solution to privacy concerns.
I. EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: PRIVACY TRADITIONS
ROOTED IN DISTINCT HISTORIES
The United States relies on homegrown features such as “the
press, plaintiffs’ bar and watchdog groups”8 for protection of data
privacy, a scheme that highlights United States citizens’
“continuing . . . ambivalence about state power.”9 The contrasting
European view of privacy as a human right—and hence of “data
protection as a fundamental human right”—aids in understanding
both the Data Protection Directive and attitudes in the European
Union towards transgressions that violate the privacy of
individuals.10 In response to the Data Protection Directive, the
United States Department of Commerce negotiated the U.S.-EU
8

GLOBAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW: SPECIAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 97TH
ANNUAL MEETING AND CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIANS
S5 (BNA 2004).
9
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 211 (1996).
10
See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 16
(2003).
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Safe Harbor Data Privacy Accord, which sets standards for
companies wishing to transfer data out of Europe.11 Companies
that undergo Safe Harbor certification are considered under the
agreement to have “adequate” safeguards in place.12 Unlike the
U.S. approach, national laws addressing privacy were passed in
European countries by the early 1990s,13 with some dating back to
the 1970s.14 These regulations generally were broad in nature,
required registration with governmental offices, and were applied
regardless of the data type.15
A. The European Union
Though much attention has been focused recently on the
differences in privacy protection approaches and regulation with
the advent of the Internet in Europe, concerns over other countries’
inadequate treatment of personal information predate the ubiquity
of the Internet.16 Norway, Austria, Germany, Sweden, France and
the United Kingdom all had blocked or prohibited data flows to at
least one other country by 1990.17 In Germany, the state of Hessen
passed the first data protection law in 1970 amid fears of a return
of the misuses of personal data that took place when the Nazis used
early data sorting devices to establish Jewish ancestry.18 Concerns
about German history repeating itself led to the formation of
governmental privacy protection agencies in all the states. By

11
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Welcome to the Safe Harbor, at
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (last visited May 5, 2005) [hereinafter Welcome to the
Safe Harbor]. See also discussion infra Part I.B.
12
Id.
13
PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 23 (1998).
14
HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1999) (noting that
France, Germany, and Great Britain all enacted privacy regulations in the 1970s).
15
SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 23 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 32–33 (1997)).
16
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 199 n.16 (1992).
17
Id.
18
David Scheer, For Your Eyes Only: Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy
Cop to the World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A1.
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1995, Germany, along with other countries, called on the European
Commission for regulation.19
1. The European Data Protection Directive
For purposes of electronic transfers of private information, the
primary modern EU rule is the European Data Protection
Directive, formally adopted on October 24, 1995, and expected to
be implemented by the Member states within three years.20 The
Data Protection Directive was created to harmonize data protection
law throughout the EU.21 It was an outgrowth of the Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data,22 which resulted in “Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal

19

Id.
Id.; EDIRECTIVES: GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW ON E-COMMERCE 121 (Arno R.
Lodder & Henrik W.K. Kaspersen eds., 2002) [hereinafter EU E-COMMERCE LAW]. In
January 2000, the European Commission took legal action against member states
(France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland) that did not pass national
laws to incorporate the data protection elements of the Directive as required. See Press
Release, European Union, Data Protection: Commission Takes Five Member states to
Court
(Jan.
11,
2000),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/10&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en; see also Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited May 5, 2005)
(providing a current listing of the relevant laws of the member states and their status).
21
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 7–8, at 31–32.
Whereas the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of
individuals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of
personal data afforded in the Member states may prevent the transmission of
such data from the territory of one Member state to that of another
Member
state; whereas this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit
of a number of economic activities at Community level, distort competition and
impede authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under Community
law; whereas this difference in levels of protection is due to the existence of a
wide variety of national laws, regulations and administrative provisions.
Id. ¶ 7, at 31–32.
22
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, ETS No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm; see also EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at
119–20.
20
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Data.”23 Those guidelines went into effect on September 23,
1980.24 However, new technologies eroded the protections of
those guidelines, and though the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development is working on a more modern
treatment, the European Union developed the Data Protection
Directive as a framework for data protection that covered the
European Union nations.25
A directive, contrasted with a regulation, is by definition an
“instruction” to European Union Member states to codify the
directive’s requirements within their national laws in the
An important aspect of the Data
designated timeframe.26
Protection Directive is the obligation that each member state
establish a “public authority” or agency to administer the
Directive’s requirements.27
The Data Protection Directive, like most European Union
regulation, focuses on private sector data transfers—governmental
uses and transfers of data are beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.28
In deference, Article 13 of the Data Protection Directive offers
exemptions to data involved in national security or public security;
crime prevention, criminal investigation, detection or prosecution;
the economic or financial interest of member states or the EU; “the
exercise of official authority” in regards to the previous; and the
protection of the individual or of “rights and freedoms of others.”29
The source of privacy protection from which the Data
Protection Directive emanates is the Charter of Fundamental
23
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (adopted Sept. 23,
1980),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 5, 2005).
24
Id.
25
See EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 119–20.
26
Simon Smith, European Data Privacy Rights Not So Scary After All, E-COMMERCE
L. & STRATEGY, Mar. 13, 2003, at 3.
27
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 28, at 47; see also KUNER, supra note
10, at 13–16 (discussing the breadth of duties of the agencies).
28
SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 7.
29
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, arts. 13(1)(a)–(g), at 42. The Directive does
not limit what member states may include within their criminal codes. JOEL R.
REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, ON-LINE SERVICES AND DATA PROTECTION AND
PRIVACY: REGULATORY RESPONSES 141–42 (1998).
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Rights of the European Union’s30 Article 8, which makes the
protection of personal data an explicit right held by the individual
and lays out a bar for legitimate need to access the data.31 To put
the protection of Article 8 into context, it is important to note that
the first article discusses the inviolability of human dignity.32 The
subsequent Articles, 2–7, are titled, respectively, Right to Life,
Right to the Integrity of the Person, Prohibition of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Prohibition of
Slavery and Forced Labour, Right to Liberty and Security, and
Respect for Private and Family Life.33 As part of this framework,
the Data Protection Directive attempts to find balance between
privacy and the desires for economic growth, recognizing that in a
strong EU marketplace, “the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital . . . require[s] not only that personal data
should be able to flow freely from one member state to another,
but also that the fundamental rights of individuals should be
safeguarded.”34
2. Other Related EU Regulations
Apart from the Data Protection Directive, the topic of data
protection was also addressed in the Telecommunications Data
Protection Directive35 and the Directive on Electronic

30

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
Protection of personal data[:]
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or
her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent
authority.
Id. art. 8, at 10.
32
Id. art. 1, at 9.
33
Id. arts. 2–7, at 9–10.
34
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 3, at 31.
35
Council Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J.
(L 24) 1.
31
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Commerce.36 The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive
applied the principles of the Data Protection Directive to the
telecommunications sector, but its limitations37 caused its repeal
and replacement by Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and
Electronic Communications (“Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications”).38 The Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications covers communication on public networks and
contains security and confidentiality provisions that relate to
information being transferred over electronic networks within the
EU.39 In addition, the Directive also delimits how cookies may be
set on computers, restricts how mobile phone location information
can be used and bans SPAM within the EU.40 Notwithstanding
these restrictions, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications contains language suggesting its support of
international commerce, communication, and the inevitable growth
of electronic transmissions: “[t]he successful cross-border
development of these services is partly dependent on the
confidence of users that their privacy will not be at risk.”41
Meanwhile, the Directive on Electronic Commerce combines
consumer protection elements with the encouragement of business,
36

Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter Directive on
Electronic Commerce]. For more information on these directives and their histories, see
EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 67–93, 119–45; Smith, supra note 26.
37
See generally Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, Retention of
Communications Data: A Bumpy Road Ahead, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
731, 732-35 (2004). “[The Telecommunications Privacy Directive] imposed wideranging obligations on carriers and service providers to ensure the privacy of users’
communications, including Internet-related activities. It covered areas that, until then,
had fallen between the cracks of data protection laws.” The Directive erred on the side of
privacy for individuals, but after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York member
countries expressed concern that the Directive could limit law enforcement agencies’
access to suspect’s communication records. Id. at 732.
38
Council Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), ¶ 4, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37
[hereinafter Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications].
39
See generally id.; New European Privacy Rules Go into Effect, COMPUTER &
INTERNET LAW., Jan. 2004, at 21.
40
Id.
41
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 38, ¶ 5, at 37.
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but steers clear of discussions of personal data protection.42 It
covers
business-to-business
and
business-to-consumer
43
commerce. Like the Data Protection Directive, it discusses the
potential abuses by Internet service providers and other possible
intermediaries in the transmission of data.44 In Article 16, the
Directive on Electronic Commerce encourages the formation of
self-regulating trade associations “representing consumers in the
drafting and implementation of codes of conduct affecting their
interests.”45
These directives act in consort with the Data Protection
Directive.46 Detailed treatment of the Data Protection Directive,
which has seventy-two recitals and thirty-four articles, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.47
3. Defintions in the Data Protection Directive
The definitions set out in the Data Protection Directive are
crucial to understanding the Lindqvist decision and the United
States’ Safe Harbor provisions. The definitions offer insight into
the Directive’s scope and the ambiguities faced by those trying to
follow its tenets.
Personal data comprises “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person.”48 The concept of
identifiable includes “reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,

42
See TERRY R. BRODERICK, REGULATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 76–77 (2000) (explaining how the Directive regulates certain
“economic activities,” but does not apply to “protection of personal data”).
43
Simon G. Zinger, Current Issues in eCommerce: Regulation of Electronic Commerce
in Europe: A Corporate Counsel Guide, 19 ACCA Docket 40, 47 (2001).
44
Id.
45
Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 36, art. 16(2), at 14.
46
See generally EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20.
47
See generally Data Protection Directive, supra note 3. For a discussion of the
Directive that predates the agreements between the EU and the U.S. Department of
Commerce, see Domingo R. Tan, Comment, Personal Privacy in the Information Age:
Comparison of Internet Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the
European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661 (1999). For a more detailed
treatment, see EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 119–20.
48
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(a), at 38.
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economic, cultural or social identity.”49 Article 2 of the Data
Protection Directive contains one of the elements of the Directive
that has raised great concern; the definition of processing, which:
shall mean any operation or set of operations which is
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise
making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction.50
One commentator wrote that “[i]t is pretty clear that just about
anything that could conceivably be done with data is covered by
the term processing.”51 Another observed that “processing,” is so
broad that “[t]he Directive could have far-reaching effects on
business practices within the United States and other ‘third
countries.’”52 The multinational corporation, with large amounts
of personal data stored in a variety of locations about both
employees and customers, the e-commerce portal of any size
whose products appeal to people throughout the world and the
company using other companies in other countries to process data
or payment or host the storage of data are all enterprises with
activities and data covered by the Data Privacy Directive if that
data refers to a European Union resident.53 The risks could be high
for large companies with decentralized or outsourced data
collection and storage.54 As companies attempt to reduce
information technology costs by outsourcing offshore or using
offsite storage, they can run into issues with the Directive.55

49

Id.
Id. art. 2(b), at 38.
51
Smith, supra note 26.
52
SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 3.
53
Cf. Scheer, supra note 18. For example, General Motors’ locations could not publish
and distribute telephone books with European employee office numbers, as even office
numbers are considered personal information, without the consent of the employees and
adherence to other regulations. Id.
54
Id.
55
Cf id. Some companies are following the European lead, the “gold standard,”
according to DuPont’s corporate counsel. DuPont has been seeking signatures on
50
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4. The Issues of Third Country Transfers and “Adequate”
Protections
The regulations concerning third country data transfers are
important for the international economy.56 Article 25 covers the
transfer to third countries: “The Member states shall provide that
the transfer to a third country of personal data which are
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer
may take place only if . . . the third country in question ensures an
adequate level of protection.”57 Adequacy “shall be assessed in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation or set of data transfer operations,” and the type and use
of the data.58 In addition,
particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing
operation or operations, the country of origin and country
of final destination, the rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which are
complied with in that country.59
The many attributes which must be considered and the ongoing
evolution of the meaning of “adequacy” in the European Union, as
well as the interplay of country-by-country interpretation of Data
Protection Directive, set the stage for some short-term
uncertainty.60
B. The United States’ Response to the Data Protection Directive:
Safe Harbor

consent forms from employees and contracts with partners that state they will protect data
they encounter. Id.
56
See Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 1350–51.
57
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 25(1), at 45 (emphasis added).
58
Id. art. 25(2), at 45. An interpretation of the meaning of transfer was one of the
things to come out of the Lindqvist decision. See discussion infra Part III.
59
Id. art. 25(2), at 45.
60
Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 1351.

FLORA

1216

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XV

The United States does not have a singular, cohesive national
law on electronic privacy protection61 and comes from a tradition
of addressing individual needs rather than general principles for
privacy regulations.62 This section will address how the U.S.
responded to the European Union’s Data Protection Directive, by
negotiating with E.U. regulators to establish the Safe Harbor
guidelines to satisfy the Directive.63
With the segregated nature of the U.S.’ treatment of data
privacy, the U.S. did not meet the EU Data Protection Directive’s
requirement that any country where Member Country residents’
data would be transferred must have “adequate” national law
protection.64 In response, the U.S. Department of Commerce
negotiated the Safe Harbor principles with the EU authorities.65
61

See id. at 1333, 1335.
See id. at 1345–46; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Protection Law and the
European Union’s Directive: The Challenge for the United States, Setting Standards for
Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995)
(“Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States has resisted all calls
for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the private
sector. Legal rules have developed on an ad hoc, targeted basis, while industry has
elaborated voluntary norms and practices for particular problems.”); Scheer, supra note
18.
63
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7.
64
See Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 56–57, at 36–37.
1. The Member states shall provide that the transfer to a third country of
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing
after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive,
the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 31(2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection within
the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of
the international commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion
of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private
lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.
Id. art. 25(1) & (6), at 45–46.
65
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7.
The safe harbor—approved by the EU in 2000—is an important way for U.S.
companies to avoid experiencing interruptions in their business dealings with
the EU or facing prosecution by European authorities under European privacy
laws. Certifying to the safe harbor will assure that EU organizations know that
your company provides “adequate” privacy protection, as defined by the
Directive.
Id.
62
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The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Data Privacy Accord was finalized in
the summer of 2000.66 “Certifying” to the Safe Harbor covers
notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and
means of enforcement and recourse. Safe Harbor provisions
require that the organization:
(1) informs users what information it collects and why,
(2) lets the user opt out (and in some instances requires that
the user opts in),
(3) addresses the passing along to another organization or
agent of the data,
(4) permits the information to be accessible by the
individual for correction or deletion,
(5) “take[s] reasonable precaution” in regard to protecting
data from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration and destruction,”
(6) ensures that data collection should be compatible with
the use and takes “reasonable steps” regarding its reliability
and accuracy, and
(7) be subject to enforcement and recourse methods.67
The negotiated Safe Harbor provisions ensure that (1) if a U.S.
firm is charged with a violation of EU privacy laws, then all
member states will be bound by the European Commission’s
finding of “adequacy” of data protection, (2) requirements of preapproval for data transfer will be granted or waived, and (3) claims
brought by EU citizens will generally be heard in the United
States.68 The concept of “adequacy” was directly addressed in
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, which affirms that the United
States’ Safe Harbor principles may meet the bar for adequate

66

Welcome to the Safe Harbor, supra note 11.
See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000),
available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm (last visited
May 5, 2005).
68
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7.
67
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protection.69 The distinction between the United States’ and
European Union’s treatment of data protection has been called the
difference between “market mechanisms” and “state regulation.”70
The Lindqvist case illustrates those distinctions clearly and
demonstrates state regulation at the extreme.
II. ISSUES RAISED IN THE BODIL LINDQVIST CASE AND
SUBSEQUENT DECISION
The first ruling interpreting the EU Data Protection Directive
came from a case originating in Sweden that tested the balance
between privacy and the power of the free Internet.71 Case C101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist arose after
Lindqvist, who was a church maintenance worker and volunteer,
took a computer class72 and created some web pages with a variety
of information about herself, her husband, and eighteen other
church volunteers without their permission.73 The web pages,
created in late 1998, “included some full names, telephone
numbers and references to hobbies and jobs held by her

69

Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by
the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by
the US Department of Commerce, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
70
See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 6 (2000).
71
Global Internet’s Fragmentation by Govts., Innovation Debated, WARREN’S WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 18, 2004. “‘It is for the national authorities and courts responsible
for applying the national legislation implementing the directive to ensure a fair balance
between the rights and interests in question, including those fundamental rights,’ such as
free expression.” Id. (citing Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2).
72
Peter Hitchens, The Superstar Footballer, A Swedish Lady’s Injured Foot . . . And a
Sinister Threat to Our Freedom, THE MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Jan. 11, 2004, at 54.
73
See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 12–14 (noting that Lindqvist originally set
up her web page, which was linked to the Church’s website, to provide information for
parishioners making Confirmation); Jacqueline Klosek, European Court Establishes
Broad Interpretation of Data Privacy Law, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2004;
see also Dan Tench, You Can’t Print That, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 5, 2004, at 10
(noting, though, that only sixteen other parishioners were included on the website).

FLORA

2005]

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

VIOLATION OF THE E.U. DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE

1219

colleagues,”74 as well as information about one person’s foot
injury.75 The pages also had information about preparing to take
Communion at the church.76
Lindqvist was asked to remove the pages, which accounts
describe as “gossipy,”77 and written in a “mildly humorous
manner.”78 She did so, but the Swedish data protection authorities
nevertheless filed a complaint against her.79 Lindqvist was
charged with having:
[1] processed personal data by automatic means without
giving
prior
written
notification
to
the
Datainspektionen . . .; [2] processed sensitive personal data
(injured foot and half-time on medical grounds) without
authorisation . . .; [and] [3] transferred processed personal
data to a third country without authorization. . . .80
Lindqvist was found guilty, fined approximately $500 and
required to contribute to a fund for crime victims.81 Part II will
review the questions sent to the European Court of Justice, and
then consider whether the decision gives guidance, concluding
with a discussion of the meaning of “transfer” as suggested in the
case.
A. The Questions the Swedish Court Sent to the European Court
of Justice.
Bodil Linqvist agreed with the facts of the case during her trial
in the district court (the Eksjö tingsrätt), but disputed her guilt and
74

Hitchens, supra note 72; see also Andre Fiebig, The First ECJ Interpretation of the
Data Privacy Directive, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Dec. 2, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 10746524.
75
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 13.
76
See id. ¶ 86.
77
Hitchens, supra note 72.
78
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 13.
79
See id. ¶ 15. Lindqvist failed to “notify the Datainspektionen . . . the supervisory
authority for the protection of electronically transmitted data.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Klosek,
supra note 73; Mark Webber, International Privacy Law Developments, in FIFTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW 2004: NEW DEVELOPMENTS & COMPLIANCE ISSUES
IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD 313 (PLI 2004).
80
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 15.
81
Klosek, supra note 73; see also Webber, supra note 79, at 313.
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appealed the district court decision.82 The Göta hovrätt, the
Swedish court of appeals, was unsure of the ramifications of the
Data Protection Directive and hence the application of European
Union law on several aspects of the case. They stayed the
proceedings and requested guidance from the European Court of
Justice.83 The Göta hovrätt posed seven questions to the European
Court of Justice regarding how the meaning of the Directive should
be interpreted.84 Part II.A of this Comment will consider the
questions and the associated commentary by those submitting
briefs and by the court.
1. On the Issue of “Processing”
The Göta hovrätt’s first question addressed whether
mentioning someone on an Internet page falls within the Data
Protection Directive’s scope, and if so, “[d]oes it constitute the
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means to
list on a self-made internet home page a number of persons with
comments and statements about their jobs and hobbies.”85 This
question, regarding the factual meaning of “processing,” greatly
concerns “third country” data collectors.86 Lindqvist submitted
that it was “unreasonable” that the “mere mention by name of a
person or of personal data in a document” would constitute
processing.87 The Swedish government, conversely, claimed that
processing under the Data Protection Directive includes “all
processing in computer format.”88 The Commission of the
European Communities asserted, “making personal data available
on the internet constitutes processing wholly or partly by automatic
means, provided that there are no technical limitations which
restrict the processing to a purely manual operation. Thus, by its
very nature, an Internet page falls within the scope of Directive
95/46.”89 The relevant article of the Directive, Article 3(1), states
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 16.
See Id. ¶ 18; Klosek, supra note 73.
For a reproduction of the questions posed to the Court, see infra App. 1.
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 18(1) (emphasis added).
Cf. Smith, supra note 26.
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id. ¶ 23.
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that “[t]his Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing
system.”90 In response to this issue, the ECJ found that:
the act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons
and identifying them by name or by other means, for
instance by giving their telephone number or information
regarding their working conditions and hobbies, constitutes
the processing of personal data wholly or partly by
automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of
Directive 95/46.91
2. If Not Processing by Automatic Means . . .
The second question was only to be addressed if the first
question was answered in the negative – that is, if the ECJ found
that the “mention of a person . . . on an internet home page [is] an
action” outside the scope of the Directive, and if the listing of the
other church members were not considered to comprise some level
of processing.92 The Göta hovrätt, in the event the first question
was answered in the negative, asked the ECJ if the
act of setting up on an internet home page separate pages
for about 15 people with links between the pages which
make it possible to search by first name be considered
to
constitute the processing otherwise than by automatic
means of personal data which form part of a filing system
or are intended to form part of a filing system within the
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46.93
This question asks whether the activities in the Lindqvist
case—if they do not consist of “processing of personal data wholly
or partly by automatic means”—instead could be considered to fall

90

Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(1), at 39.
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 27.
92
Id. ¶ 18(1), (2). Processing in ¶ 18(1) is either “wholly or partly by automotive
means.”
93
Id. ¶ 18(2) (emphasis added).
91
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under the filing system component of Article 3(1).94 Because the
ECJ found that the creation of the Internet pages did fall under the
scope of the Directive as defined in the first case of Article 3(1), it
did not address whether or not they fell under the second.95
Considering, arguendo, that the Court needed to address
Article 3(1)’s second case, the ECJ might have helped clarify some
of the ambiguity surrounding the Directive’s scope; the definitions
section of the Directive gives little true guidance to what would be
considered a “filing system,” saying merely that a “‘personal data
filing system’ . . . shall mean any structured set of personal data
which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether
centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or
geographical basis.”96
3. Did This Activity Fall under One of The Article 3(2)
Exceptions?
The next question the European Court of Justice addressed in
the decision was whether the facts at hand could possibly fall
under exceptions in Article 3(2) of the Data Protection Directive
exempting “processing of personal data . . . by a natural person in
the course of a purely personal or household activity.”97 Lindqvist
raised the issue of freedom of expression, claiming that those
“creat[ing] internet pages in the course of a non-profit-making or
leisure activity are not carrying out an economic activity and are
thus not subject to Community law.”98 The Court called

94
95
96
97

Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(1), at 39.
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2,. ¶ 28.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(c), at 38.
Id. art. 3(2) at 39:
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data:
- in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law,
such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union
and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence,
State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the
State in areas of criminal law,
- by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.

Id.
98

Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 30.
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Lindqvist’s activities “charitable and religious,”99 but said that, in
addition to covering activities of the state (in defense and public
safety, for example), the exceptions of Article 3 were to be taken
literally and to apply to the “activities . . . expressly listed there or
which can be classified in the same category.”100 It held that the
exceptions did not apply to the “charitable and religious” activities,
but rather applied to the “exercise of activities which are
exclusively personal or domestic, correspondence and the holding
of records of addresses.”101 Moreover, the ECJ held that the
exception of Article 3 applied to “activities . . . carried out in the
course of private or family life of individuals”102 and not to
“publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible
to an indefinite number of people.”103 The Court said that the
information Lindqvist published was not within the realm of the
exceptions.104
In its comments to the Court, the Commission of the European
Communities made several interesting arguments, suggesting that
the interpretation of the exceptions listed in the Directive may be
the grounds for further discussion.105 The Commission asserted
that the aim of the Directive was “to regulate the free movement of
personal data in the exercise not only of an economic activity, but
also of social activity in the course of the integration and
functioning of the common market,”106 and that to interpret
otherwise “might entail serious problems of demarcation,”107
especially insofar as the possibility of “pages containing personal
data intended to disparage certain persons with a particular end in
view might then be excluded from the scope of that directive.”108
4. Did the Data Concern Health?
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. ¶ 39.
See id. ¶ 44.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id.
See id. ¶ 48.
See id. ¶¶ 30–36.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id.
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The fourth question the Göta hovrätt sent to the EJC was
whether “reference” to a foot injury and to the fact that the injured
person was working half-time on medical grounds “constitute[]
personal data concerning health,” as defined in Article 8(1) of the
Directive.109 The Court held that information regarding health—
both mental and physical—should be given a “wide
interpretation,” and that the reference was clearly health
information under the Directive.110 Article 8 sets forth “special
categories” of data, namely “personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs,
trade-union membership and the processing of data concerning
health or sex life.”111
These types of information are not considered “special” in
regards to processing, as far as the exceptions laid out in Article
8(2) are concerned. These exceptions include: when the person
has “given . . . explicit consent,”112 in employment law situations
where allowed by national law and protected by “adequate
safeguards,”113 when “necessary to protect the vital interests of the
data subject or of another person where the data subject is
physically or legally incapable of giving his consent,”114 when the
data is for legal claims,115 or for “preventive medicine, medical
diagnosis . . . or the management of health-care services, and
where those data are processed by a health professional subject
under national law or rules established by national competent
bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy.”116 Additionally,
the Directive explicitly allows for member state utilization of a
universal identification number in this section.117
It is interesting to note that the Swedish authorities did not
raise the question of whether information about the church
volunteers, by naming them as church volunteers, also violated this
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. ¶ 49.
Id. ¶ 50.
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 8(1), at 40.
Id. art. 8(2)(a), at 40.
Id. art. 8(2)(b), at 40.
Id. art. 8(2)(c), at 40.
Id. art. 8(2)(e), at 41.
Id. art. 8(3), at 41 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 8(7), at 41.
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sphere of “special categories” of data in regard to data about
“religious or philosophical beliefs.” Among the exceptions for use
of “special category” information is one allowing for:
processing . . . in the course of its legitimate activities with
appropriate guarantees by a . . . non-profit-seeking body
with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim
and on condition that the processing relates solely to the
members of the body or to persons who have regular
contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the
data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of
the data subjects.118
The facts of the Lindqvist case clearly indicate that the data
subjects did not give their consent.119
5. Was There a “Transfer” of Data?
The fifth question referred by the Göta hovrätt addresses the
meaning of “transfer” under Article 25 of the Directive.120
“Transfer” is not defined within the Directive, either in the
definitions section, Article 2, or in Chapter IV on the “Transfer of
Personal Data to Third Countries.”121 Throughout the body of the
Directive, however, transfer is used in discussions about moving
data to third countries.122
The reference to the EJC specifically asked if there was a
transfer of data in the construction of a web page, which was then
stored as part of a site that could be visited by users from other
118

Id. art. 8(2)(d), at 40–41.
See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 14.
120
See id. ¶ 52.
121
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2, at 38–39; arts. 25–26, at 45–46.
122
The following are examples of instances where transfer is used to describe the
moving of data to third countries: paragraphs 37 (on freedom of information); 56 (on
international trade); 57 (on the adequacy of protection in third countries); 58 (on the need
for exceptions to paragraph 57); 60 (on limiting transfers from member states only to
third countries that are in compliance with the Directive); 66 (on making the Commission
responsible for the implementation of a process for implementation of the Directive’s
components); Article 19 (regarding the notifications required to the member states about
information being moved); and of course, Chapter IV, titled “Transfer of Personal Data to
Third Countries” (covering in which cases and under what protections transfers outside of
the EU can take place). See id. at 34–37, 44–46.
119
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countries (including third countries).123 Additionally, it questioned
whether the lack of use of the page by third country residents or
the hosting of the page in a third country would affect the response
to whether data transfer had taken place.124 In most of the other
questions posed to the ECJ, the countries and the Commission of
the European Communities, in submitting commentary, suggested
reasoning and conclusions very much along the lines of the Court’s
decisions.125 In their commentary regarding the fifth question,
however, the Swedish government and the Commission state that
putting data on the Internet “so that they become accessible to
nationals of third countries, constitutes a transfer of data to third
countries” under the Directive, even if there had been no third
country call to the data.126 The issue of data transfer was the third
count on which Lindqvist was prosecuted in the lower Swedish
courts; she “transferred processed personal data to a third country
without authorization.”127 Transfer is used to discuss moving data
from one state to another, as opposed to moving or presenting
information from a server hosting web pages to a user’s computer.
The Court emphasized this distinction in its response to the
question.128
The Court responded that in order to see Lindqvist’s pages, a
user would have to connect to the Internet and request the pages in
question,129 but that “Mrs[.] Lindqvist’s internet pages did not
contain the technical means to send that information automatically
to people who did not intentionally seek access to those pages.”130
The Court continued by emphasizing that Chapter IV of the Data
Protection Directive makes no specific mention of the Internet:131
123

See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 52.
See id.
125
See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20–27.
126
Id. ¶ 53.
127
Id. ¶ 15.
128
See id. ¶¶ 59–71.
129
See id. ¶ 60.
130
Id.
131
See id. ¶ 67. “[I]t does not lay down criteria for deciding whether operations carried
out by hosting providers should be deemed to occur in the place of establishment of the
service or at its business address or in the place where the computer or computers
constituting the service’s infrastructure are located.” Id. Indeed, the term the “Internet” is
not found anywhere in the body of the Directive. See generally id.
124
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one cannot presume that the Community legislature
intended the expression transfer . . . to a third country to
cover the loading, by an individual in Mrs Lindqvist’s
position, of data onto an internet page, even if those data
are thereby made accessible to persons in third countries
with the technical means to access them.132
In its next Recital, the Court held that if transfer were equated
to publication on the Internet, any publication of personal data on
the Internet would be a transfer to all Internet-accessing third
countries. Further, the Court held that if there were a singular
Internet-accessing third country without adequate protection, then
“Member states would be obliged to prevent any personal data
being placed on the internet.”133
6. Is Freedom of Expression Abridged?
The sixth question referred by the Göta hovrätt addressed
whether, by the application of the Data Protection Directive to
facts of the Lindqvist case, conflicts arise with freedom of
expression or other fundamental rights.134 The Court responded
that the Directive is broad, thus covering many possible situations,
but that the protection of fundamental freedoms—expression and
the protection of individual privacy among them—are inherent in
the text of the Directive.135 The Lindqvist Court urged other courts
in member states to apply proportionality in future questions and to
use care so that neither member state law nor the Directive is
interpreted in a manner that infringes on the freedom of
expression.136 As in this case “Mrs[.] Lindqvist’s freedom of
expression in her work preparing people for Communion and her
freedom to carry out activities contributing to religious life have to
be weighed against the protection of the private life of the

132
133
134
135
136

Id. ¶ 68.
Id. ¶ 69. The United States would certainly be considered such a third country.
See id. ¶ 72.
See id. ¶¶ 79, 82.
See id. ¶ 87.
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individuals about whom Mrs[.] Lindqvist has placed data on her
internet site.”137
7. How Much Latitude Does a Member State Have in Privacy
Legislation?
The seventh question referred by the Göta hovrätt asked
whether a member state could have more restrictions than those
found within the Directive.138 This question strives to determine if
the Directive is meant as baseline legislation or as a piece of
harmonizing legislation.139 The ECJ responded that member states
may apply national legislation to areas beyond the scope of the
Directive-based legislation as long as that extension is not
prohibited by other Community law.140 The ECJ further described
the Directive’s ambition as “harmonisation which is generally
complete.”141 Analyzing Recital 10 of the Directive, the ECJ
responded that the goal of the Directive is equivalence in the laws
of the member states,142 but that the Directive accords “a margin
for [Member states to] manoeuvre in certain areas and authorises
them to maintain or introduce particular rules.”143 The ECJ held
that legislation “must be consistent both with the provisions of
Directive 95/46 and with its objective of maintaining a balance
between freedom of movement of personal data and the protection
of private life.”144
B. Does the Decision Offer Guidance or Cause More Confusion?
Lindqvist did not expect to lose the case.145 “She . . . view[s]
this as Big Brother gone mad. She sees this as an infringement of
137

Id. ¶ 86.
See id. ¶ 91.
139
Id. ¶¶ 91–99. Once again, the Commission urges a somewhat different take on the
matter in its comments to the Court: “The Commission therefore submits that a Member
state cannot make provision for more extensive protection for personal data or a wider
scope than are required under the directive.” Id. ¶ 94.
140
Id. ¶ 99.
141
Id. ¶ 96.
142
Id. ¶ 95.
143
Id. ¶ 97.
144
Id. ¶ 99.
145
Hitchens, supra note 72.
138
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her rights. She did this for a bit of fun and was hounded by
parishioners and even the vicar,” her lawyer told the press.146 He
said that she asked to be prosecuted as a test case.147 The case
offers an interesting framework for comparison between data
protection in the United States and European Union. An action
such as this would be highly unlikely in the United States without
at least the perception of harm by some party.148 In the United
States, the party perceiving harm would seek to remedy that harm,
generally as an individual with an equity or tort claim.149 In
contrast, the Lindqvist case emphasizes that the Data Protection
Directive applies to information about individuals—individually,
as opposed to large amounts of gathered information about a group
of individuals—and offers those individuals a right of action.150
That right of action is carried out on the behalf of the individual
who claims a misuse of their information.151
C. What Is a Transfer?
Lindqvist is the first case on the questions of transfer to third
country and whether creating Internet pages is, per se, a transfer.152
146
Id. Lindqvist’s lawyer, Sture Larsson, said, “She feels like the victim of a medieval
witchhunt rather than a member of an advanced European society.” Id.
147
Id.
148
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 963–64 (1989).
149
There are also some cases in which state law could offer protection. See discussion
infra Part III.B.4.
150
See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2. “Member states shall provide for
the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him
by the national law applicable to the processing in question.” Data Protection Directive,
supra note 3, art. 22, at 45.
1. Member states shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.
2. The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he
proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.
Id. art. 23, at 45.
151
Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 28, at 48 (“Each supervisory authority
shall hear claims lodged by any person, or by an association representing that person,
concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of
personal data. The person concerned shall be informed of the outcome of the claim.”).
152
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 69.
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In Recital 69 of the Lindqvist decision, the response to the question
of the meaning of data transfer is unambiguous:
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to
mean that there is transfer [of data] to a third country every
time that personal data are loaded onto an internet page,
that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third
countries where there are the technical means needed to
access the internet.153
Hence, the implications of defining transfer as such would be
stupendous and unwieldy. “[I]f the Commission found . . . that
even one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the
Member states would be obliged to prevent any personal data
being placed on the internet,” the decision continues.154 Save the
Safe Harbor provisions, the United States is considered such a
third country, thus, it is fair to assume that there would at least be
one third country with inadequate protection.
The Court enunciated, “it must be concluded that Article 25 of
Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that operations such
as those carried out by Mrs. Lindqvist do not as such constitute a
transfer [of data] to a third country.”155 But then, what meaning
does “transfer” have within the Data Protection Directive?
[T]here is no transfer [of data] to a third country within the
meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an
individual in a Member state loads personal data onto an
internet page which is stored with his hosting provider
which is established in that State or in another Member
state, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who
connects to the internet, including people in a third
country.156
So a transfer to a third country is not what the facts of the
Lindqvist case state, nor is it making Internet pages that are hosted
on servers in one’s own or another European Union member
153
154
155
156

Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.A.4.
Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 69 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 70.
Id. ¶ 71.
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state.157 This raises, but leaves unanswered, the issue of whether
transfer takes place when information about EU residents, placed
there by residents of EU member states, appears on Web pages
hosted on servers in non-member countries.158
In the past, content on Web pages hosted in the U.S. has
received foreign attention.159 If such content included personal
information about residents, it could, under the possibility raised
above, draw the attention of the European Court of Justice. The
Court has expressed a lack of interest in considering the possible
access of Internet pages by third country residents;160 this suggests
157

See id. ¶¶ 69–71.
See id. ¶ 70 (“It is thus unnecessary to investigate whether an individual from a third
country has accessed the internet page concerned or whether the server of that hosting
service is physically in a third country.”). For a pragmatic discussion of what businesses
need to do and how they need to approach the Data Protection Directive, see A BUSINESS
GUIDE TO CHANGES IN EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION 25–124 (1999).
159
In November 2000, a French judge, in a widely criticized opinion, told Yahoo! that
French users had to be prevented from seeing pages on the U.S. version of the auction
site that sold Nazi war memorabilia and neo-Nazi objects. Timothy D. Casey & Jeff
Magenau, A Hybrid Model of Self-Regulation and Governmental Regulation of
Electronic Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2002).
If the company did not comply, it would be heavily fined (about $14,000/day). Id. The
items had been taken off the French Yahoo! sites. Id. at 17. French law “strictly prohibits
the display or sale of objects that incite racial hatred.” See Yahoo!’s French Connection,
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?
Story_ID=431328 (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). The dispute has also been heard in U.S.
courts, as Yahoo! sought declaration that the French ruling did not apply to the U.S.
versions, but was told by the Ninth Circuit that Yahoo! could not assert a First
Amendment right until the French organizations sought relief in U.S. courts. See Yahoo!,
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir.
2004).
The implications [of the French judge’s decision] for e-commerce jurisdiction
are significant, as businesses seeking to avoid regulation in a foreign country
may be forced not only to refrain from purposefully
directing
prohibited
content at nationals of the regulating country, but could actually be required to
install protective measures to prevent nationals from a regulating country, even
those speaking another language than their native tongue, from accessing a site
not specifically directed at them.
Casey & Magenau, supra, at 17.
160
See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 70–71; see also Taylor Wessing, Bodil
Lindqvist C-101/01, at http://www.taylorwessing.com/topical/intellectual_property/
1103_bodil.html (last visited May 5, 2005). The issue of transfer outside the context of
Web pages has been an issue before the court, especially in the context of employment
information being transferred from one office in the European Union to another corporate
158
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to interested parties that the Court’s definition of transfer has no
dependencies on the location of the data from a technological point
of view, nor is the Court interested in parsing distinctions about
recipients of the data in the definition of transfer.
III. THE LINDQVIST DECISION IS NARROW, INADEQUATE, AND
MISUNDERSTANDS THE REALITIES OF BUSINESS
Bodil Lindqvist was a private citizen who built Internet pages
as homework for a class she was taking.161 She was not involved
in commerce nor was she collecting large amounts of data about
individuals. Indeed, the actions that got her into trouble were
geared toward enhancing her community and connecting with and
serving fellow church members.162 When she was asked to take
down the pages, she acquiesced.163 The facts of the case specify
neither embarrassment on the part of the subjects of the pages nor
any harm, economic or otherwise.164 Yet the case came before the
Swedish data protectors and was escalated.165 The possibility of
having each and every citizen claim that his or her privacy has
been compromised by a use of information about him or her
somewhere on the Internet is a monumental bureaucratic disaster,
one which is it difficult to imagine was the imagined intent of the
drafters of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.166 In
conclusion, Part III will address some of the breaches of personal
data outside of the European Union, then review the existing law in
the United States covering the protection of personal information,
before concluding that U.S. lawmakers should use the Lindqvist
office, either within or outside the EU. A discussion of this is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
161
See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
162
See id. ¶ 12 (discussing how the original impetus behind Lindqvist’s creation of her
Web page was to provide information for fellow congregants who would be receiving
Confirmation).
163
Id. ¶ 14 (“She removed the pages in question as soon as she became aware that they
were not appreciated by some of her colleagues.”); Klosek, supra note 73.
164
See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 13–14.
165
See Klosek, supra note 73.
166
Id. “The court’s finding highlights the fact that Europe’s data protection regime is
extremely far reaching. The enforcement action that was launched against Lindqvist, and
validated in large part, by the ECJ, is not likely to be the last of its kind.” Id.
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case as a warning of the sorts of poor decisions that can result from
heavy-handed centralized legislation.
A. Breaches of Personal Information
The Lindqvist case is an extremely minor exposure of limited
personal information. In contrast, breaches of security have
affected customers of GMAC Insurance,167 Equifax Canada,168
and, in February 2005, at “data collection giant,” ChoicePoint.169
San Diego State University and Indiana State University have both
experienced invasions that have compromised the security of
employee and student information.170 In all these cases, at least
thousands of personal records were compromised.171 Less than a
month after the ChoicePoint compromise, a suit had already been
filed seeking class status for those whose information was
involved.172 Compared to these actions, and the resulting potential
damage to the financial security of those individuals involved, the
condemnation by the European Court of Justice of Lindqvist’s
actions appears draconian and abusive.
The breaches in the United States, and the resulting outcry
from consumers, have caused politicians to call for more cohesive
laws governing data protection and punishing companies whose
data is compromised.173 But U.S, legislators should view the
167
See George V. Hulme, Breach of Trust, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 3, 2004, at 58.
GMAC Insurance had two laptops stolen with 200,000 records containing “Social
Security numbers, home addresses, and credit scores,” while Equifax Canada alerted
more than 1400 people of a breach. Id. San Diego State alerted 178,000 about possible
exposure during hackers’ attack. See id. Meanwhile, nearly 145,000 people in Choice
Point’s systems had information including Social Security numbers and addresses passed
to a con artist. Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2005, at C1.
168
See Hulme, supra note 167.
169
Zeller, supra note 167.
170
See Hulme, supra note 167.
171
GMAC Insurance had two laptops stolen with 200,000 records containing “Social
Security numbers, home addresses, and credit scores,” while Equifax Canada alerted
more than 1400 people of a breach. Id. San Diego State alerted 178,000 about possible
exposure during hackers’ attack. See id. Meanwhile, nearly 145,000 people in
ChoicePoint’s systems had information including Social Security numbers and addresses
passed to a con artist. Zeller, supra note 167.
172
Zeller, supra note 167.
173
Id.
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Lindqvist decision as a warning sign in the dangers of broadly
legislating privacy.
In the aforementioned breaches, the
individuals whose information was exposed suffered harm, and
that harm was suffered by more than one person.174 To better
understand the methods of remediating possible harm, it is first
important to understand the major laws governing private
information.
B. The Range of Privacy Regulations in the U.S. Currently
The U.S. Department of Commerce itself calls the U.S.
approach a “sectoral . . . mix of legislation, regulation, and self
regulation.”175 The legislation includes the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, which addresses the use of credit reports and means for
resolving disputes by consumers of the information contained
within them;176 the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which states
that motor vehicle agencies cannot release personal information
about licensees;177 the Privacy Act of 1974, which controls the
information held on individuals by the government agencies and
how it may be disclosed;178 legislation on school records;
workplace privacy laws, where the privacy rights afforded private
and governmental employees are vastly distinct;179 the law on the
use of polygraphs;180 and the law governing the disclosure of
medical information;181 to name just a few.182

174

Id.
Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7. “The European Union, however, relies on
comprehensive legislation that, for example, requires creation of government data
protection agencies, registration of data bases with those agencies, and in some instances
prior approval before personal data processing may begin.” Id.
176
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
177
18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000).
178
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
179
Workplace privacy rights differ for the approximately three million U.S. federal
employees and their private sector counterparts. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG,
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 618–19 (2003). For a more detailed discussion of the
protections afforded federal employees, see id. at 618–85.
180
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000).
181
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 210 (2000)).
182
For an overview of U.S. federal legislation on privacy, state counterparts, and cases
involving privacy, see HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 40–85.
175
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1. Protecting Children Online
The federal government has been particularly interested in
protecting children online by attempting to protect their privacy
and prohibiting them from seeing inappropriate content.183 COPA
and COPPA are oft-confused but different pieces of legislation
with much history. The Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”)184
addressed marketing and obscenity that might be seen by
children.185 The Supreme Court has held, however, that COPA is
likely unconstitutional in its interference with the protections of the
First Amendment.186 In contrast, the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (“COPPA”),187 an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934, is still viable.188 COPPA, which is
administered by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), addresses
the online collection of personally identifiable information about
children (defined as those under 13).189 It requires parental
consent and information control when a website targeted to
children collects personally identifiable information and limits the
use of cookies and other tracking devices.190
183

Much has been written about children and the Internet. See, e.g., Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Childproofing the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 447 (2003); Melanie Hersh,
Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out?: The Child Online Privacy Protection Act as Proof that
Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children’s Interests on the Internet, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831 (2001).
184
47 U.S.C. § 231.
185
47 U.S.C. § 231
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
Id.
186
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789, 2795 (2004); Krotoszynski, supra note
183, at 453–55.
187
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501–06 (2000).
188
Id.
189
15 U.S.C.A. § 6501(1).
190
See Facts for Businesses, How to Comply with the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Rule, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/coppa.htm (last visited
May 5, 2005).
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and Rule apply to individually
identifiable information about a child that is collected online, such as full name,
home address, email address, telephone number or any other information that
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2. Protection of Health Information
Health information is generally less protected. “Our private
health information [is] being shared, collected, analyzed, and
stored with fewer federal standards than video store records,”
reported Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human
Services under the Clinton administration.191 Some recourse does
exist for the misuse and inappropriate processing of sensitive
personal information in the U.S. The Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)192 was enacted primarily
so that employees could more easily change jobs without being
penalized by health insurance companies for pre-existing
conditions, but it also included provisions for more protection of
health information.193 Nonetheless, emphasizing Shalala’s point
above, individuals incur responsibility only when associated with
official functions in a medical office under HIPAA.194
3. Privacy as Consumer Protection
The FTC also has enforcement powers for privacy violations
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.195 The FTC’s traditional
consumer protection role is expanding as it takes an active interest

would allow someone to identify or contact the child. The Act and Rule also
cover other types of information—for example, hobbies, interests and
information collected through cookies or other types of tracking mechanisms—
when they are tied to individually identifiable information.
Id.
191

DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 65 (1998).
192
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 210 (2000)).
193
See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 179, at 210.
194
Id.
195
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.).
Gramm-Leach-Bliley broadly covers financial institutions as well as
brokerages, tax return preparations, financial advising companies, credit counseling and
others. See Privacy Initiatives, Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, at
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/index.html (last visited May 5, 2005); see also Mike
Hatch, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: The Privatization of Big Brother:
Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st
Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2001).

FLORA

2005]

11/21/2005 1:11 PM

VIOLATION OF THE E.U. DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE

1237

in the prosecution of transgressions.196 Indeed, the agency’s
website states that “[p]rivacy is a central element of the FTC’s
consumer protection mission.”197 “The Federal Trade Commission
is educating consumers and businesses about the importance of
personal information privacy, including the security of personal
information.”198 For example, the FTC was involved in a
controversy after the Internet retailer Toysmart declared
bankruptcy and ran advertisements offering its database of
customer information for sale.199 The FTC came to an agreement
with Toysmart for terms under which it could make the sale, an
action disputed by the attorneys general of thirty-eight states.200 In
the end, the issue was moot, as an investor bought the database and
destroyed the information within. Even so, the case raised issues
about the many players with stakes in privacy disputes and data
ownership.201 It also may be considered an an example of how the
“sectoral” approach can work in the United States, where despite
controversy between them, government officials and the courts
ended up with a just result.
As in Europe, personal privacy is a deep-rooted concern.
There is some irony in the fact that Lindqvist’s actions were
viewed as “gossipy”202 when one reflects back to the seminal
Warren and Brandeis treaty on privacy, the adoption of which is
believed to have been a response to an active press desperate for
details about society.203 The Warren and Brandeis treaty was
rooted in concern about “intrusions into individual privacy by
nineteenth century journalists armed with the latest technological
innovations.”204 Though technology continually changes (it was
the increasing use of newspaper photography that made those
196

See Privacy Initiatives, Introduction, at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html (last
visited May 5, 2005).
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 389 (2003).
200
See id. at 390.
201
See id.
202
See supra text accompanying note 77; see also Hitchens, supra note 72.
203
Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis,
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703, 709 (1990).
204
Id. at 703.
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commentators pause),205 the underlying concept of finding a right
to action in tort remains the staple of law in the United States for
damage to reputation.
4. The Tort of Violating Another’s Privacy
Though the transfer or processing of data is not regulated in the
United States,206 a person who violates the privacy of another by
creating a web page, for instance, could face liability for “the
resulting harm to the interests of the other,”207 generally under
state law.208 This invasion of privacy is generally understood to
mean one of four invasions: “(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, . . . (b) appropriation of the other’s name or
likeness, . . . (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private
205

“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.’ “ Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
206
In the United States, with limited exceptions, the processing and transferring of data
per se is not among those activities that either the state or federal governments monitor.
In the U.S., Lindqvist would not, either as an individual or a business, have been required
to register with any entity before creating Web pages or even sending data from her
location to others. If she had begun to operate as a business, she could have made the
determination that she should apply for a privacy seal such BBBOnline (part of the Better
Business Bureau. See http://www.bbbonline.org (last visited May 5, 2005)), TRUSTe
(Founded by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, TRUSTe had 1413 websites carrying
their seal as of Sept. 2004. See http://www.truste.org/about/fact_sheet.php (last visited
May 5, 2005)) or WebTrust (See http://www.cpawebtrust.org/homepage.htm (last visited
May 5, 2005). The WebTrust program is administered by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants). Or she might decide to join a self-regulating organization
such as the Direct Marketing Association, which would require her business to follow
their best practices and offer complaining consumers a forum for their grievances on
privacy violations. See http://www.the-dma.org/aboutdma (last visited May 5, 2005).
And example of sectoral self-monitoring, the DMA has issued a “Privacy Promise” that it
expects member organizations to follow in addition to business practice guidelines in
several areas. See Direct Marketing Association Guidelines for Ethical Business Practice,
at http://www.the-dma.org/guidelines/ethicalguidelines.shtml (last visited May 5, 2005).
The Direct Marketing Association is the largest trade organization for business involved
in
“direct,
database,
and
interactive
global
marketing.”
See
http://www.dmaconsumers.org/privacy.html (last visited May 5, 2005).
207
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
208
For information on which forms of information are protected on a state-by-state
basis, see http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (last visited May 5, 2005).
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life, . . . or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a
false light before the public . . . .”209 In Lindqvist, the veracity of
the material is not discussed.210 Assuming, arguendo, the
information printed was not false, the closest tort question would
be unreasonable publicity,211 which generally requires that the
publicity be of “a kind that . . . would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.”212
CONCLUSION
The Swedish court found Lindqvist guilty of three counts:
processing personal data by automatic means without notifying the
authorities, the processing of sensitive personal data, and transfer
of data to third countries.213 The European Court of Justice said
Lindqvist had not been guilty of a transfer, but that she was guilty
of processing and that the data involved included health
information.214
Lindqvist was clearly a test case of the Data Protection
Directive, one that pushes many issues and muddies as much as it
clarifies. As Lindqvist’s lawyer stated, “This decision emphasises
the wide-reaching and indiscriminate nature of the European
Union’s data protection laws.”215 He’s not alone in thinking that
the EU rules are short-sighted and may in the end stifle the
businesses they claim to encourage. A study commissioned by the
European Commission and executed by the United Kingdom-based
209

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2.
211
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy.”).
212
Id. § 652D(a).
[A]nyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of
the community life of which he is a part. Thus he must expect the more or less
casual observations of his neighbors as to what he does, and that his comings
and goings and his ordinary daily activities, will be described in the press as a
matter of casual interest to others.
Id. § 652D cmt. c.
213
See discussion supra Part II.
214
See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2. See also discussion supra Part II.
215
Hitchens, supra note 72.
210
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Consumers International casts doubt on the assertion of U.S. data
protection inadequacy.216 The five-year study of 751 websites in
the United States and Europe, released in 2001, found that
“[d]espite tight EU legislation . . . U.S.-based sites tend to set the
standard for decent privacy policies.”217 It also found that eighty
percent of European websites surveyed did not comply with EU
data storage opt-out rules and only about one-third direct users to
privacy policies, another EU requirement.218 “The evidence is that
enforcement [of the regulations] is simply not happening.”219
“When you talk to the national regulators who are supposed to
make sure the rules are applied, they always complain of a lack of
funding and a lack of staff for an enormous amount of work.”220
Meanwhile, in New York, the online arm of lingerie retailer
Victoria’s Secret agreed to a fine of $50,000 by Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer for exposing the orders, names, and addresses of more
than 560 customers.221 “The consumer protection laws of the
1930s have become the privacy law of the 21st century,” Spitzer
told the New York Times.222
And so, in the United States, the debate continues about the
various approaches: unified federal law on privacy, state laws, and
the market-driven, self-regulating approach to privacy. “There
may soon come a point when a business community will have to
decide whether it prefers a single comprehensive federal rule, or a
situation in which a variety of state rules create difficult-to-follow
mandates,” argued then-FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky in a 2000
speech in Washington, D.C., questioning the self-regulation of the
U.S. ecommerce industry.223 From a U.S. business perspective, it
216

See Ben Vickers, Europe Lags Behind U.S. on Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20,
2001, at B11I.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. (quoting Anna Fielder, Director of Consumers International in London).
220
Id.
221
John Schwartz, Victoria’s Secret Reaches a Data Privacy Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2003,
at C14.
222
Id.
223
Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Chief Says E-Commerce Industry Should Reconsider
Privacy-Rules Stance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B3. Deborah Platt Majoras was
sworn in on August 16, 2004, as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. For the
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is difficult to fathom the potential chaos and confusion from a
national law like the Data Protection Directive.
The conclusions reached in the Lindqvist case, especially as the
Web pages she created were not considered to be part of
“household” activities, are difficult to imagine even amid our
litigious and highly regulatory-prone U.S. climate; the wide reach
of the European Court of Justice seems contrary to some forms of
community building in our open society. Additionally, the sixth
question addressed to the ECJ—whether freedom of expression
would be hindered by finding that Lindqvist violated the
Directive—it seems possible that the suppression of more
controversial information or discussion, for example the location
of radioactive waste sites, the addresses of convicted sex offenders,
or the salaries of high-level government employees, might have
been found to violate freedom of expression. The implications for
bloggers, the Internet diarists whose commentary increasingly
finds its way into the mainstream media, are considerable. But on
both sides of the Atlantic, it likely will take more cases like the
Lindqvist decision and more near-misses such as the Toysmart
settlement before the issues are settled.
The United States Department of Commerce did a disservice to
businesses transacting with the residents of the European Union in
agreeing to the Safe Harbor provisions. The “self-certification”
process is effectively meaningless and tedious for the companies
who attempt it, and allows the flaws of the European Union’s Data
Protection Directive to find their way into the much more
responsive and agile system in the United States.

text of Majoras’s speeches, see Speeches/Articles by Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras.htm (last updated May 9, 2005).
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Appendix 1 – Questions sent to the European Court of
Justice
Recital 18 of Case 101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil
Lindqvist224
18. As it had doubts as to the interpretation of the Community
law applicable in this area, inter alia Directive 95/46, the Göta
hovrätt decided to stay proceedings and refer the following
questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
(1) Is the mention of a person—by name or with name and
telephone number—on an internet home page an action which falls
within the scope of [Directive 95/46]? Does it constitute the
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means to
list on a self-made internet home page a number of persons with
comments and statements about their jobs and hobbies etc.?
(2) If the answer to the first question is no, can the act of
setting up on an internet home page separate pages for about 15
people with links between the pages which make it possible to
search by first name be considered to constitute the processing
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing
system within the meaning of Article 3(1)?
If the answer to either of those questions is yes, the hovrätt also
asks the following questions:
(3) Can the act of loading information of the type described
about work colleagues onto a private home page which is none the
less accessible to anyone who knows its address be regarded as
outside the scope of [Directive 95/46] on the ground that it is
covered by one of the exceptions in Article 3(2)?
(4) Is information on a home page stating that a named
colleague has injured her foot and is on half-time on medical
grounds personal data concerning health which, according to
Article 8(1), may not be processed?

224

Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 18.
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(5) [Directive 95/46] prohibits the transfer of personal data to
third countries in certain cases. If a person in Sweden uses a
computer to load personal data onto a home page stored on a server
in Sweden—with the result that personal data become accessible to
people in third countries—does that constitute a transfer of data to
a third country within the meaning of the directive? Would the
answer be the same even if, as far as known, no one from the third
country had in fact accessed the data or if the server in question
was actually physically in a third country?
(6) Can the provisions of [Directive 95/46], in a case such as
the above, be regarded as bringing about a restriction which
conflicts with the general principles of freedom of expression or
other freedoms and rights, which are applicable within the EU and
are enshrined in inter alia Article 10 of the European Convention
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?
Finally, the hovrätt asks the following question:
(7) Can a Member state, as regards the issues raised in the
above questions, provide more extensive protection for personal
data or give it a wider scope than the directive, even if none of the
circumstances described in Article 13 exists?

